# Neodymium
> The rare earth element powering NdFeB permanent magnets in EV motors, wind turbines and weapons; China controls 91% of global NdPr refining and 94% of magnet output.

**Meta:** type: reference · date: 2026-07-03 · heads:  · 4 takes · 3 lenses · 3 regions

## What it is

Neodymium (symbol Nd, atomic number 60) is a silvery-white rare earth metal in the lanthanide series. Its commercial importance rests almost entirely on one compound: neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB), the highest-energy-product permanent magnet known. NdFeB magnets go into EV drive motors, wind turbine generators, and the precision-guidance systems of ballistic and cruise missiles. Neodymium is sold commercially as a neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) alloy, since praseodymium carries similar magnetic properties and is extracted together. China controls roughly 60% of global rare earth mining, 91% of NdPr refining and separation, and approximately 94% of sintered NdFeB magnet production, making it the dominant actor across every link in the value chain.

## History

Austrian chemist Carl Auer von Welsbach isolated neodymium from didymium (a substance previously thought to be a single element) in 1885. For most of the following century it found modest use in glass coloring and laser optics. The critical inflection came in 1982, when John Croat at General Motors and Masato Sagawa at Sumitomo Special Metals in Japan independently developed NdFeB sintered magnets, producing magnetic performance several times stronger than the previous state of the art (samarium-cobalt). China's rare earth reserves, concentrated in Inner Mongolia's Bayan Obo deposit, were commercialized at scale from the 1980s; Chinese producers drove prices low enough to push Western rare earth mining out of business by roughly 2000. China demonstrated it would weaponize that dominance in 2010, cutting export quotas during the Japan-China Senkaku/Diaoyu maritime standoff and triggering a global supply panic. That episode directly prefigured the April 2025 export-control escalation.

## Current state

NdPr metal prices peaked at approximately $137/kg in April 2026, up 160% from $53/kg at the January 2026 open, following China's April 2025 export-licensing regime on seven heavy rare earth elements and a second wave in October 2025 covering five more REEs plus processing technologies. The [price spike](/ar/n/ndpr-price-surge-2026) drove ex-China NdPr to roughly six times Chinese domestic prices at the peak; by June 2026 it traded near $109.55/kg, still approximately double early-2025 levels. The US primary response is the DoD-MP Materials partnership formalised in July 2025: the Pentagon holds $400 million in MP equity and guarantees a $110/kg NdPr price floor for 10 years, with MP's Fort Worth, Texas "Independence" facility having begun commercial NdFeB magnet production in December 2025 (see [شركة MP Materials تبدأ إنتاج مغناطيس NdFeB في تكساس ووزارة الدفاع الأميركية أكبر مساهم فيها](/ar/n/mp-materials-magnet-ramp)). On the refining side, Australia's [Eneabba refinery](/ar/n/iluka-eneabba-refinery-2026) reached 50% construction in Q1 2026 with a mid-2027 commissioning target, and [Lynas](/ar/n/lynas-texas-limbo) remains the only other large-scale non-Chinese NdPr separator. The EU classified neodymium as a strategic raw material under the Critical Raw Materials Act ([القائمة الثانية للمشاريع الاستراتيجية في قانون المواد الخام الحيوية بالاتحاد الأوروبي تضيف 47 مشروعاً في الليثيوم والنيكل والكوبالت والعناصر الأرضية النادرة؛ أول التصاريح خلال 24 شهراً](/ar/n/eu-crma-strategic-projects)), though member states still source 85% of light REEs and 98% of rare earth magnets from China.

## Relationships

Neodymium sits at the intersection of the EV transition, the defence industrial base competition, and the US-China trade war. [China's January 2026 dual-use export ban on Japan](/ar/n/china-rare-earth-japan-controls) showed how NdPr supply can function as coercive economic statecraft: Japan reduced rare earth dependence on China from 90% in 2010 to 60-70% by 2026, but remains nearly fully dependent on Chinese-processed heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium. The IEA projects demand for neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium in permanent magnets will grow by a third by 2030 under current policies, and by 4-7x by 2040 in clean energy transition scenarios. Every automaker and wind-turbine OEM with a decarbonisation target faces structural NdPr cost exposure; so does any defence programme reliant on high-performance magnets.

## What to watch

- Whether ex-China NdPr prices stabilise above $90/kg through H2 2026 or correct toward Chinese domestic levels as China's Ministry of Commerce issues more export licences.
- Progress at Australia's Eneabba refinery ([مصفاة إينيابا التابعة لشركة إيلوكا تبلغ 50٪ من الإنشاء وتؤمّن عقود شراء ملزمة من صانعي سيارات لـ1200 طن سنويًا؛ وشركة إنرجي فيولز تستهدف فصل العناصر النادرة الثقيلة في يوتا بحلول الربع الرابع من 2026](/ar/n/iluka-eneabba-refinery-2026)) and Energy Fuels' White Mesa Mill in Utah, the two facilities that could add non-Chinese NdPr and heavy REE separation capacity before 2028.
- The [MP Materials Fort Worth](/ar/n/mp-materials-magnet-ramp) production ramp toward 1,000 tonnes/year of NdFeB magnets, which is the only US magnet production at scale.
- Whether China formally widens the October 2025 processing-technology controls beyond November 2026, when a current suspension on that wave expires.
- NdFeB recycling: urban mining of end-of-life EV motors and turbines is nascent but could reduce primary NdPr demand in the 2030s.

## Regional takes (batched by bias / lens)

### official record
- **USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Rare Earths)** (United States, en) — Annual US government survey: documents global rare earth mine production at 390,000 tonnes REO equivalent in 2024; China accounts for ~60% of mined supply and ~91% of separation and processing; US production from Mountain Pass estimated at 45,000 tonnes REO.
  Source: https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-rare-earths.pdf
- **IEA (International Energy Agency), commentary on export controls** (Global, en) — IEA institutional commentary documenting that ex-China NdPr prices reached up to six times Chinese domestic prices after China's April 2025 export-licensing regime; estimates 4-7x growth in demand for Nd, Pr, Dy and Tb in permanent magnets by 2040 vs 2018 levels.
  Source: https://www.iea.org/commentaries/with-new-export-controls-on-critical-minerals-supply-concentration-risks-become-reality

### US security think-tank
- **CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies)** (United States, en) — October 2025 analysis by Gracelin Baskaran documenting China's new FDPR-style magnet controls (requiring approval for magnets with 0.1% or more Chinese-origin REE content) and their threat to US F-35, submarine and missile supply chains; notes China controls 70% of mining, 90% of separation, 93% of magnet manufacturing.
  Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-rare-earth-and-magnet-restrictions-threaten-us-defense-supply-chains

### EU parliamentary analysis
- **European Parliament Think Tank** (Europe, en) — November 2025 briefing documenting EU exposure: 85% of light REEs and all heavy REEs sourced from China; 98% of rare earth magnets from China; over 80% of large European firms are three or fewer intermediaries from a Chinese REE producer; maps EU policy responses under the Critical Raw Materials Act.
  Source: https://epthinktank.eu/2025/11/24/chinas-rare-earth-export-restrictions/

## Across the graph
- Related: [[mp-materials-magnet-ramp]], [[ndpr-price-surge-2026]], [[iluka-eneabba-refinery-2026]], [[lynas-texas-limbo]], [[eu-crma-strategic-projects]], [[china-rare-earth-japan-controls]]
- Entities: Commodity:neodymium, Commodity:rare Earth Magnets, Commodity:dysprosium, Corporate:mp Materials, Refining Separation

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Canonical: https://rbtfl.xyz/ar/n/neodymium-dossier