# US–China Trade > The United States and China's bilateral trade relationship totaled over US$650 billion in goods and services in 2024, making it the highest-stakes commercial axis in global great-power competition. **Meta:** type: reference · date: 2026-07-03 · heads: · 4 takes · 2 lenses · 1 regions ## What it is The US–China trade relationship is the bilateral commercial exchange between the world's largest and second-largest economies by GDP. Total US goods-and-services trade with China reached US$658.9 billion in 2024. The United States runs a persistent goods deficit with China, US$295.4 billion in goods in 2024, partially offset by a services surplus of US$33.2 billion. The relationship is governed by WTO rules supplemented by two bilateral instruments: the Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement, signed January 15, 2020, and Section 301 tariff actions administered by the US Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). On the Chinese side, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) handles trade negotiations and retaliatory measures. ## History China joined the WTO in December 2001. The US goods deficit with China grew steadily thereafter, reaching a record US$419 billion in 2018. USTR launched a Section 301 investigation in August 2017, citing Chinese forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft. Tariffs on US$34 billion of Chinese goods took effect July 6, 2018, the formal start of the bilateral trade war. Three additional tranches followed through 2019, covering roughly US$370 billion in Chinese goods at rates of 7.5 to 25 percent. China retaliated with equivalent duties on US agricultural and industrial products. The Phase One deal, signed January 15, 2020, paused escalation: Beijing committed to purchasing an additional US$200 billion in US goods and services above 2017 baseline levels over two years. Beijing fulfilled only about 58 percent of those commitments by end-2021, according to Peterson Institute for International Economics analysis. The Biden administration retained all Trump-era tariffs. In September 2024, USTR finalized a statutory four-year review, raising duties on specific sectors: electric vehicles to 100 percent, solar cells to 50 percent, lithium-ion batteries to 25 percent, and steel and aluminum to 25 percent. ## Current state As of mid-2026, the relationship is in a period of managed friction following a June 11, 2026, framework agreement holding baseline tariffs at 30 percent while technology-sector negotiations continue. Total US goods trade with China fell to US$414.7 billion in 2025, reflecting a 29.7 percent drop in Chinese imports and a 25.8 percent drop in US exports from 2024, driven by tariff-induced trade diversion. USTR launched a new Section 301-style investigation in June 2026 targeting Chinese forced-labor supply chains, adding a potential 12.5-percentage-point surcharge on top of existing duties; see [the USTR forced-labor tariff probe](/ja/n/us-ustr-forced-labor-tariffs-2026). The US Commerce Department's connected-vehicle software ban produced its first market exit: [Polestar was barred from the US market in June 2026](/ja/n/polestar-us-ban-connected-vehicle-2026) after failing to isolate its Chinese-parent software stack. Chinese exports continue rerouting through Vietnam, Mexico, and other third-country hubs to partly circumvent duties. ## Relationships The trade relationship is inseparable from broader US-China strategic competition. US Commerce Department semiconductor export controls, imposed from October 2022, restrict advanced chips reaching Chinese firms; China has retaliated with critical-mineral export controls on rare earths and graphite. Chinese official holdings of US Treasuries have declined from a peak of approximately US$1.3 trillion in 2013 to roughly US$760 billion by early 2026, reducing China's leverage in debt markets but also reducing a potential source of financial pressure the US once assumed Beijing held. US agricultural states with concentrated exposure to Chinese soybean, pork, and cotton purchases face the most direct bilateral political risk from any tariff escalation. ## What to watch The June 2026 framework holds baseline tariffs at 30 percent with a stated intent for further negotiation; whether the [USTR forced-labor probe](/ja/n/us-ustr-forced-labor-tariffs-2026) finalizes into a permanent 12.5-point surcharge in late 2026 is the most immediate variable. Chinese critical-mineral export controls on rare earths and graphite remain the most credible retaliatory lever Beijing holds. WTO dispute panels covering the Section 301 tariffs remain unresolved, and any adverse ruling would force the United States to formally justify or restructure the tariff architecture. The pace of trans-shipment rerouting through Vietnam and Mexico will determine whether the tariff regime produces genuine supply-chain decoupling or primarily inflates US consumer import costs without changing where production is located. ## Regional takes (batched by bias / lens) ### official record - **United States Trade Representative** (United States, en) — USTR country page for China documenting bilateral trade totals (US$658.9 billion in goods and services in 2024), the Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement, and the Section 301 tariff framework. Source: https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china - **US Census Bureau** (United States, en) — Monthly US Census trade-balance series for China (code 5700), the primary dataset for bilateral goods exports, imports, and the deficit; updated monthly with annual revisions. Source: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html - **United States Trade Representative** (United States, en) — USTR index of all Section 301 China tariff lists (Lists 1 through 4), exclusion processes, and the statutory four-year review completed in September 2024; the legal record of the tariff architecture in force from July 2018. Source: https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/tariff-actions ### analysis - **Peterson Institute for International Economics** (United States, en) — PIIE working paper documenting the Phase One agreement purchase commitments and fulfilment rate; finds that China purchased roughly 58 percent of the pledged US$200 billion in additional US imports over 2020 and 2021. Source: https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/us-china-trade-war-and-phase-one-agreement ## Across the graph - Related: [[polestar-us-ban-connected-vehicle-2026]], [[us-ustr-forced-labor-tariffs-2026]] - Entities: US China Trade, Person:donald Trump, Person:xi Jinping, Org:wto --- Canonical: https://rbtfl.xyz/ja/n/us-china-trade-dossier