# ASEAN's South China Sea Code of Conduct deadline passes without agreement, as China presses on Sandy Cay > The Philippines, as 2026 ASEAN Chair, had targeted July for a completed CoC text, a promise three years in the making. Analysts and diplomats now uniformly say the deadline has been missed while China raised its flag on Sandy Cay and installed new barriers near Second Thomas Shoal. **Meta:** type: story · date: 2026-07-01 · heads: 장기전, 그들이 말하지 않는 것 · 5 takes · 4 lenses · 5 regions ## Summary The [Philippines](/ko/entity/philippines) entered 2026 as ASEAN Chair with a stated goal of completing South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations by mid-year, the most ambitious timeline set since ASEAN and [China](/ko/entity/china) agreed to negotiate a framework in 2023. The July deadline has now passed without an agreed text. Analysts from Singapore's ISEAS, Chatham House, and The Diplomat had forecast this outcome as early as late 2025, citing irreconcilable positions: [China](/ko/entity/china) wants a geographically narrow, non-binding document that excludes external parties like the US; ASEAN claimants (the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia) want broader scope, enforcement, and freedom for bilateral security partnerships. Meanwhile [China](/ko/entity/china)'s physical activity in the sea has continued during talks: it raised its flag on Sandy Cay in the Spratly Islands and installed new barriers near Second Thomas Shoal. ## The split Beijing argues the CoC process is progressing and that external interference, primarily US freedom-of-navigation operations and the US-Philippines-Japan security architecture, is the destabilising factor. Manila's position is structurally contradictory: President Marcos's administration simultaneously deepens economic engagement with China (agriculture, infrastructure) while anchoring the military relationship with the US, Australia, and Japan. Vietnam and Malaysia hold similar dual-track positions and are unwilling to accept a text that limits their options with external partners. ASEAN's consensus requirement means that Laos and Cambodia, both closely aligned with Beijing, can block any strong statement. ## By the numbers - July 2026, deadline that passed without a CoC text - 2023, when ASEAN and China committed to completing negotiations "by 2026" - Sandy Cay (Spratly Islands), where China raised its flag in 2026 during talks - 6, ASEAN member states with direct South China Sea claims or interests in the outcome - 3, consecutive missed CoC deadlines since formal negotiations began in 2018 ## Why it matters The CoC failure matters for shipping, energy, and defence. The [South China Sea](/ko/entity/south-china-sea) carries roughly one-third of global maritime trade. Without a binding framework, Chinese coast guard and maritime militia operations will continue to escalate incrementally, each individual incident too small to trigger a formal response but collectively foreclosing claimant access to fishing grounds and hydrocarbon blocks. For ASEAN, the failure signals the limits of the bloc's consensus diplomacy when confronting a member state's strategic interests. ## What to watch - Whether the ASEAN Summit in October 2026 attempts to revive negotiations or quietly drops the target - China's next physical move in the Spratlys or Scarborough Shoal following the diplomatic pause - US freedom-of-navigation operations and any change in frequency or route - Whether the Philippines files new arbitration cases following the deadline's expiry --- ## Regional takes (batched by bias / lens) ### Indo-Pacific specialist - **The Diplomat** (Japan/Global, en) — Set out Manila's ambition as 2026 ASEAN Chair: use the chairmanship to complete a binding or quasi-binding Code of Conduct text governing all parties' behaviour in the South China Sea, a goal ASEAN and China agreed to in 2023. Quoted Philippine negotiators who described July 2026 as the realistic outer deadline. > "Manila is hoping to conclude the South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations during its 2026 ASEAN chairmanship. Diplomats now say the deadline has not been met." Source: https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/philippines-hoping-to-conclude-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-in-2026/ ### UK policy research - **Chatham House** (United Kingdom, en) — Forecast in December 2025 that the CoC would not be concluded in 2026, citing structural divergences: China prefers a narrowly geographic and non-legally-binding text, ASEAN claimants want broader scope and enforcement mechanisms, and the Philippines 'does not speak with a single voice' between its economic engagement with China and its security partnership with the US. > "The Philippines as ASEAN Chair faces a near-impossible task: a South China Sea Code of Conduct cannot realistically be concluded in 2026." Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/12/philippines-asean-chair-south-china-sea-agreement-unlikely-be-concluded-2026 ### Southeast Asian academic - **Fulcrum (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute)** (Singapore, en) — Analysed the structural reasons the South China Sea will remain unstable in 2026: China's incrementalism (each small physical move is below the threshold of military response but accumulates territorial control), Manila's dual-track approach (diplomatic engagement plus US security arrangements), and ASEAN's consensus paralysis that makes a unified position impossible. > "Between talks and tensions, the South China Sea will not stabilise in 2026." Source: https://fulcrum.sg/between-talks-and-tensions-why-the-south-china-sea-wont-stabilise-in-2026/ ### unlabelled - **South China Morning Post** (Hong Kong, en) — Source: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3345137/south-china-sea-expert-warns-2026-code-conduct-simply-not-achievable - **Frontiers in Political Science** (Global, en) — Source: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2026.1699631/full ## Across the graph - Related: [[taiwan-strait]], [[south-china-sea-dossier]] - Entities: China, Philippines, Asean, South China Sea --- Canonical: https://rbtfl.xyz/ko/n/south-china-sea-coc-failure-jul2026