Italy's population stabilizes at 58.9 million in 2025 through immigration as TFR falls again to 1.14, far below replacement
ISTAT provisional data for 2025 show 355,000 births against 652,000 deaths, a net natural loss of nearly 300,000; only net immigration of comparable scale prevented further total population decline for a third year
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Summary
Italy's national statistics institute ISTAT released provisional 2025 demographic data confirming that Italy Demography the country recorded approximately 355,000 births against 652,000 deaths in 2025, a net natural population loss of approximately 297,000. The total fertility rate fell to 1.14 children per woman, down from 1.18 in 2024, extending Italy's run as one of the EU's lowest-fertility countries. The total population stabilized at approximately 58.943 million on January 1, 2026, essentially unchanged from a year earlier, but only because net immigration from abroad offset the natural deficit. The average age rose to 46.8 years and those over 65 accounted for 24.7 percent of the population. Projections from ISTAT and Eurostat show Italy's population falling below 50 million by 2050, with more than a third of the population over 65 at that point. Italy has been recording births below deaths continuously since the early 2010s, and the 2025 total is consistent with a structural acceleration in natural decline driven by the aging of the baby-boom cohort and persistently low fertility among younger Italians.
The split
The Meloni government's communications on demographics emphasised pronatalist measures including a 1,000-euro baby bonus expanded in 2024, but Italian press coverage noted that the TFR continued declining despite these incentives, and feminist commentators highlighted that inadequate childcare, a large wage gender gap and a persistently high share of unpaid domestic work borne by women make cash transfers ineffective in isolation. Immigration remains the political flashpoint: ISTAT data made explicit that immigration was the mechanism preventing a further net population loss, which several Italian media outlets framed as a direct challenge to the government's anti-immigration positioning. Left-leaning European press drew explicit connections between the demographic arithmetic and the incoherence of restrictive immigration policy for aging Southern European societies. Demographic researchers in Germany and Japan covered Italy's trajectory as a leading indicator for similarly aging societies.
By the numbers
- 58.943 million, Italy's resident population on January 1, 2026
- 355,000, approximate births in Italy in 2025
- 652,000, approximate deaths in Italy in 2025
- ~297,000, net natural population loss in 2025
- 1.14, total fertility rate in 2025 (down from 1.18 in 2024)
- 2.1, replacement-level TFR (Italy is 46% below)
- 46.8 years, average age of Italy's population as of January 1, 2026
- 24.7%, share of Italy's population over 65
- <50 million, projected population by 2050 (Eurostat)
Why it matters
[[Italy-demography]] Italy is the largest EU economy with a persistently below-replacement TFR and one of the EU's oldest populations, making it a critical case for European demographic policy. The dependency ratio, which compares working-age population to retirees, is deteriorating in ways that put pressure on Italy's public pension system (already one of the most expensive as a share of GDP in the OECD), its healthcare system and its long-term debt dynamics. The data confirm that immigration is not a theoretical future solution to Italy's demographic deficit but an active and current stabilizing mechanism, yet immigration policy remains politically contested. Italy's demographic trajectory is the template against which EU institutions and member states assess long-run fiscal sustainability in Southern Europe.
What to watch
- Whether Italy's 2026 births fall further or stabilize below the 355,000 2025 figure
- Whether the Meloni government adjusts immigration policy in response to demographic data
- Debate in EU institutions over whether Italy's pension and fiscal trajectory is sustainable without immigration-driven workforce replenishment
- Comparison with France, which maintains a TFR of 1.6 through a combination of family policy and immigration, as a countermodel