Al-Shabaab (Somalia)

What it is

Al-Shabaab (Arabic: "the Youth"; full name Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, "Movement of Warrior Youth") is a Salafi-jihadist armed group that controls and taxes large swaths of southern and central Somalia. Formally affiliated with al-Qaeda since February 2012, it is the network's primary East Africa wing. The group runs a parallel administration in territory it holds, collecting zakat and market taxes from farmers, merchants, and charcoal exporters; the UN Panel of Experts has estimated annual revenues near US$100 million. Leadership is structured around a shura council and executive committee. Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubayda) has been emir since September 2014, when the previous leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane (Mukhtar Abu Zubayr), was killed in a US airstrike. Beyond Somalia, al-Shabaab conducts attacks in Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, targeting civilians, military personnel, and government institutions.

History

Al-Shabaab emerged from the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which briefly seized Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia in mid-2006. Ethiopian forces, backing the Somali Transitional Federal Government, ousted the UIC in December 2006. The most radical UIC faction reconstituted as al-Shabaab and waged a guerrilla insurgency against the successor federal government. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), authorized in 2007, drove the group from Mogadishu in August 2011. Al-Shabaab then shifted to spectacular regional attacks: the July 2010 Kampala bombings targeted Ugandan civilians watching the FIFA World Cup final and killed 76 people; the September 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi killed 67; the April 2015 Garissa University massacre in Kenya killed 148; and the October 2017 Zoobe Junction truck bomb in Mogadishu killed at least 587 people, Africa's deadliest modern terrorist attack by casualty count. From 2022 to 2023, Somalia's Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), backed by the AMISOM successor mission ATMIS and clan militia (the Macawisley), drove al-Shabaab from dozens of towns across Hiiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle. ATMIS concluded its mandate in December 2024. The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) took over on 1 January 2025, authorized at up to 12,626 uniformed personnel including 1,040 police.

Current state

By late 2025, al-Shabaab had reversed nearly all 2022-23 government gains. The UN Panel of Experts (November 2025) found the group had changed its offensive posture, attacked and held key areas in Middle and Lower Shabelle, gained strategic and territorial ground, and increased access to major supply routes and financial resources while pushing operations closer to Mogadishu. It retook Moqokori (Hiiraan) in July 2025 and contested Wargaadhi and other Middle Shabelle towns through the remainder of 2025. AUSSOM operates with roughly 12,000 troops, far below AMISOM's 22,000 peak; troop-contributing countries at an April 2025 Kampala summit requested at least 8,000 additional personnel to address the deterioration. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) continues periodic airstrikes: a strike near Welmaro (approximately 103 km north of Kismayo) on 19 June 2026 targeted al-Shabaab fighters, and Somali security operations killed 28 militants in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle that month, including commander Abdirahman Abdi Mudallib. The 2026 Shabelle offensive tracks the tactical and strategic trajectory in detail as of June 2026.

Relationships

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), based in Mogadishu, is al-Shabaab's primary adversary. AUSSOM provides the main external military support to the FGS. AFRICOM conducts unilateral lethal strikes in coordination with Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab operates within al-Qaeda's global network; ISIS-Somalia, a rival group aligned with Islamic State, operates mainly in Puntland in northern Somalia and competes for recruits and territory. Kenya and Ethiopia have experienced al-Shabaab cross-border attacks and both contribute troops to AUSSOM. The clan-militia Macawisley, central to the 2022-23 offensive, has seen recruitment and morale erode as al-Shabaab retook ground, a dynamic the CTC and Africa Center both highlight as structural, not incidental.

What to watch

AUSSOM's funding and whether troop-contributing countries close the 8,000-personnel shortfall. A potential FGS counteroffensive and its dependence on Macawisley clan-militia support, which proved critical in 2022-23 but fragile under sustained pressure. Whether al-Shabaab extends operations to Mogadishu's immediate outskirts, threatening the airport corridor and the capital's commercial lifeline. ISIS-Somalia's expansion in Puntland and any friction or accommodation with al-Shabaab. US airstrike tempo under AFRICOM and any policy shift from Washington.