South Korea records 254,500 births in 2025, a 15-year high, but total fertility rate remains world's lowest at 0.80
Statistics Korea's February 2026 provisional data show a second consecutive annual rise in births and a TFR recovery from 0.75 to 0.80, driven by an increase in marriages, while natural population decline continues for a 75th straight month
リストに追加
リストはまだありません。
Summary
South Korea's Ministry of Data and Statistics released provisional birth and death data on February 25, 2026 showing 254,500 births in 2025, up 6.8 percent from 2024 and the highest figure since 2010. The total fertility rate (TFR) rose to 0.80 from 0.75 in 2024, recovering to the 0.8 level for the first time since 2021 and marking a second consecutive year of improvement after South Korea had recorded the world's lowest TFR for several years running. The increase was attributed mainly to a multi-year rise in marriage registrations, which typically precedes a rise in births by one to two years. Despite the improvement, natural South Korea Demography population decline continued for the 75th straight month, with deaths continuing to exceed births. In January 2026, the monthly TFR reached 0.99, the closest the figure has been to 1.0 since the early pandemic period, though analysts noted the monthly figure is seasonally volatile. Statistics Korea projects the South Korean population, currently at 51.7 million, will fall to 36.2 million by 2072.
The split
South Korean government and ruling-party media framed the two consecutive years of birth increase as evidence that the administration's pronatalist spending was beginning to have an effect. Opposition media questioned whether the rise was structural or a temporary marriage cohort effect and noted that South Korea has spent an estimated 280 trillion won on fertility policies since 2006 with little sustained impact on the TFR. International demographic research communities cautioned against reading a single two-year uptick as a reversal, citing that the TFR at 0.80 remains far below the replacement rate of 2.1. Nikkei Asia and East Asian economics press focused on the marriage-rate driver, noting that similar short-lived recoveries in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s did not become durable trends. North Korean state media has occasionally cited South Korea's birth crisis as evidence of capitalist social failure, though demographic data from North Korea is unavailable for comparison.
By the numbers
- 254,500, births in South Korea in 2025 (provisional; highest since 2010)
- 0.80, total fertility rate for 2025 (up from 0.75 in 2024)
- 6.8%, year-on-year increase in births in 2025
- 0.99, monthly TFR in January 2026 (approaching 1.0)
- 11.7%, year-on-year increase in births in January 2026
- 75, consecutive months of natural population decline as of early 2026
- 51.7 million, current South Korean population
- 36.2 million, Statistics Korea projection for 2072 (30% decline)
- ~280 trillion won, cumulative pronatalist spending by South Korea since 2006
Why it matters
South Korea is the most extreme current example of demographic contraction among middle- and high-income countries, and its experience informs policy and research across East Asia, where Japan, China and Taiwan face related although less acute trends. The two-year uptick in births creates a natural experiment: if the trend continues and strengthens, it may provide evidence that specific policy combinations (flexible work, childcare subsidies, housing support) can bend the curve; if it stalls, it will reinforce the academic consensus that structural economic factors in high-cost urban societies suppress fertility below levels that any plausible policy mix can reverse. The implications for pension systems, defence recruitment, healthcare demand and long-run GDP growth make South Korea Demography one of the most closely watched demographic stories in the world.
What to watch
- Full-year 2026 birth data and whether the monthly 2026 figures sustain above 2025 levels
- Marriage rate data as a leading indicator for births in 2027-28
- Whether South Korea's housing affordability interventions make measurable progress
- Japanese and Chinese government reactions and whether the Korean uptick influences their own pronatalist programmes