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The Coup Belt

The arc of West and Central African states where military juntas displaced elected governments nine times since 2020, reshaping the Sahel's security and great-power alignments.

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What it is

The Coup Belt is the informal name for the arc of West African, Sahelian, and Central African states where military officers ousted elected or civilian governments nine times between August 2020 and August 2023 alone. The belt runs roughly west to east across the continent's midsection: Guinea on the Atlantic coast, then Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in the landlocked Sahel core, then Chad, Sudan, and Gabon further east. Guinea-Bissau was added in November 2025. No single trigger explains every coup, but the cases cluster around common structural conditions: security vacuums created by jihadist insurgencies that civilian governments could not contain, resentment of French post-colonial military and monetary influence, and weak democratic institutions unable to deliver results. The juntas that took power increasingly model themselves on one another and draw on overlapping external patrons.

History

The wave accelerated after Mali's August 2020 coup, when Col. Assimi Goïta's National Committee for the Salvation of the People ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, citing security failures against jihadists. Goïta moved again in May 2021, removing the transitional president and consolidating personal rule. Chad's military took power in April 2021 after President Idriss Déby was killed at the front; his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby, was installed by the army command. Guinea followed in September 2021, when Col. Mamadi Doumbouya seized power from longtime president Alpha Condé. Burkina Faso suffered two coups in 2022: Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in January, then Capt. Ibrahim Traoré ousted Damiba in September, again citing security failures. Niger's presidential guard overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023, and Gabon's military removed President Ali Bongo in August 2023 after a disputed election. By early 2024, nine successful coups had occurred in the region since 2020, alongside at least seven failed attempts.

Current state

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger responded to ECOWAS pressure by forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as a mutual defense pact on September 16, 2023, formalized as a confederation on July 6, 2024. On January 28, 2024, all three announced withdrawal from ECOWAS, which formally took effect on January 29, 2025. All three expelled French ambassadors and terminated defense cooperation agreements with France. Russia, through the Wagner Group and its successor Africa Corps, deployed approximately 1,000 fighters to Mali and sent security advisers to Burkina Faso and Niger. Jihadist groups affiliated with JNIM (al-Qaeda's Sahel affiliate) and the Islamic State Sahel Province have expanded their territorial control throughout the transition period, the opposite of what the juntas promised. Guinea-Bissau added another case to the belt in November 2025, when soldiers arrested President Umaro Sissoco Embaló three days after a disputed election (see ギニアビサウでクーデター、選挙係争のわずか数日後に権力掌握「本物か芝居か」). Madagascar's October 2025 coup, geographically distant, raised parallel questions about whether the model was spreading to the Indian Ocean (see Z世代の蜂起と反乱を起こした軍部隊がマダガスカルのラジョエリナを打倒).

Relationships

The coup belt intersects with broader patterns of executive aggrandizement across sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda's Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba, President Museveni's son and designated political heir, demonstrated a variant in June 2026: deploying military force against independent media rather than staging a formal coup (see ウガンダ軍司令官がネーション・メディア・グループの軍事閉鎖を命令、「私は報道の自由を信じない」と宣言). The AES countries are pursuing a common monetary framework to replace the CFA franc, which ties fourteen African countries to the French treasury and requires France to hold foreign exchange reserves. The African Union imposed suspension on each junta state after its respective coup, but the suspensions have produced little leverage where Russia fills the resulting diplomatic and economic gap. France's departure has created security vacuums that neither AES coordination nor Russian advisers have closed.

What to watch

Whether Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger deliver on promised elections, all deferred since each coup. The durability of ECOWAS after losing three members and whether other coup-affected states apply for AES membership. Progress on the AES common currency and military integration. Whether AU suspension translates into any practical leverage as Russian and Gulf relationships absorb Western pressure.

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