Military space: ASAT weapons, missile-warning satellites and the orbital interceptor race

What it is

The military space beat tracks how states use orbital infrastructure as a weapon and a target. Modern warfare depends on satellites for positioning, communications, and early warning of missile launches. States that can destroy, jam, or blind those satellites gain an asymmetric edge over opponents who rely on them. This beat covers four interlinked subjects: anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and the broader counterspace toolkit; the US Space Force as the western world's principal space-warfare service; missile-warning constellations that detect ballistic and hypersonic threats from orbit; and the Golden Dome space layer, a US programme to place interceptors in orbit for the first time since the Cold War.

History

The Soviet Union completed the first successful on-orbit ASAT intercept in 1968, destroying the satellite Cosmos 248. Both superpowers ran competing co-orbital and direct-ascent programmes through the 1970s and early 1980s, then largely shelved them after 1985 under diplomatic and budgetary pressure. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the US missile-warning constellation still flying today, traces its origins to a 1996 programme of record.

China's January 2007 direct-ascent test against the Fengyun-1C weather satellite created the largest debris cloud in history, more than 3,000 tracked fragments, most still in orbit. India destroyed a satellite at 300 km altitude in March 2019 under "Mission Shakti," demonstrating a proven direct-ascent capability. The US Space Force was established by the US National Defence Authorisation Act of December 2019, separating space operations from the US Air Force for the first time. The US Space Development Agency (SDA), created in March 2019, was tasked with fielding missile-warning and data-transport satellites on an accelerated commercial schedule.

Current state

As of mid-2026, the Secure World Foundation tracks 13 states developing counterspace capabilities across five categories: co-orbital, direct-ascent, electronic warfare, directed energy, and cyber. ASAT testing has created 6,904 cataloged debris pieces, of which 2,773 remain in orbit. China reportedly conducted an on-orbit refuelling experiment through most of 2025 and may be developing a new direct-ascent interceptor. Russia continues rendezvous-and-proximity operations near western satellites.

The US Space Force budget passed US$40B for fiscal year 2026, see 우주군 예산 400억 달러 돌파, 의회 미사일 경보·데이터 전송 레이어 강화. The centrepiece of the new US warning architecture is Next-Gen Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR), replacing the ageing SBIRS fleet. A GAO audit in January 2026 found SDA is overestimating technology maturity across the US$35B programme and lacks an integrated schedule; the first GEO satellite launch slipped to no earlier than 2026. On the interceptor side, 12 companies share a US$3.2B contract for space-based interceptor (SBI) prototypes under the Golden Dome programme (see 골든 돔 궤도 계층, 궤도 요격 시연을 향해 가속), targeting a 2028 integration date. June 2026 brought the first live Golden Dome test, a directed-energy system that defeated drone and cruise-missile threats (see 펜타곤, 골든 돔 첫 시험 '완전 임무 성공' 선언).

Relationships

The four roster subjects are tightly coupled. ASAT threats from China and Russia are the primary political and budgetary justification for Space Force growth. Space Force operates the missile-warning constellation that feeds targeting data to terrestrial interceptor batteries and, going forward, to orbital interceptors. The Golden Dome space layer depends on those same warning satellites for cueing, an interceptor in orbit is useless without a sensor network covering the same orbital plane. The counterspace arms race also runs in reverse: a proliferated SBI constellation is itself a potent ASAT weapon, a dual-use ambiguity that complicates any arms-control proposal and drives Chinese and Russian opposition to the Golden Dome architecture.

What to watch

• Next-Gen OPIR GEO satellite launch, targeted late 2026, and whether SDA's Tranche 1 tracking satellites can achieve on-orbit missile detection without operator cueing, the key unproven requirement flagged by the GAO.
• SBI prototype test results, expected 2028, and which of the 12 vendors advances to a production contract.
• China's reported new direct-ascent interceptor: confirmation would mark the first Chinese weapon explicitly capable of reaching geostationary orbit, where US missile-warning satellites operate.
• The UN Group of Governmental Experts process on space arms control: Russia and China back a treaty banning weapons in space; the US opposes any regime that would constrain its SBI programme.
• Russia's alleged nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, assessed by US intelligence as real: if deployed operationally, it would threaten the entire LEO satellite population regardless of nationality.