Antimony supply shortages persist after a 2,600% price spike; tungsten APT surged 557% as Almonty commissioned South Korea's Sangdong mine

Summary

China controls over 80% of global Antimony production and approximately 80% of refined Tungsten output. Export controls on both metals, imposed progressively since 2023-2025, created persistent supply shortages and price spikes that no non-Chinese producer has yet bridged at scale. Antimony peaked at $59,750 per tonne in July 2025, up 2,600% from the $2,200/t range that prevailed before controls, and supply shortages continued through June 2026 despite a nominal US-China trade-truce suspension of the US-specific ban. Antimony is used in military munitions primers, tracer bullets, flame retardants, lead-acid battery plates, and antimony-trioxide fire retardants in semiconductor packaging. Tungsten ammonium paratungstate (APT) broke $450/MTU and powder reached approximately $55,000/tonne, up 557% since China added tungsten to its export control list in February 2025; simultaneous wartime depletion of stocks in Ukraine and Iran conflicts amplified the price effect. The US placed a January 1, 2027 deadline on excluding Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean tungsten from defence procurement. Almonty Industries completed Phase 1 commissioning of the Sangdong tungsten mine in South Korea on March 17, 2026, the first Korean tungsten production in over 30 years, with Phase 2 targeting 40% of ex-China global supply by 2027.

The split

US and European defence analysts frame the antimony-tungsten squeeze as the next stage of China's sequential critical-minerals leverage strategy, following the template proven with gallium and germanium: establish controls, let prices spike, then negotiate from a position of market power. Chinese government commentary presents both controls as normal export management practices consistent with WTO rules. Southeast Asian producers (Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar for antimony; South Korea for tungsten via Almonty Sangdong) are positioned as the medium-term alternative, but their timelines are 2027-2028. The OilPrice analysis notes antimony's ammunition-supply dimension: Western defence contractors cannot quickly substitute for antimony in munitions without reformulating chemical processes that have not changed in decades. For tungsten, the hardmetals and cutting-tool industry (drills, milling inserts, wire-draw dies) is a civilian demand far larger than defence, spreading exposure broadly across manufacturing.

By the numbers

• $59,750/t, antimony peak price, July 2025 (up 2,600% from pre-controls).
• $450/MTU, tungsten APT price in 2026 (up 557% from 2024 lows).
• ~$55,000/t, tungsten powder price in 2026.
• 80%+, China's share of global refined antimony and refined tungsten production.
• 200+, types of military munitions using antimony as a component.
• 2,300 tpa, Almonty Sangdong Phase 1 concentrate output.
• 40%, Sangdong Phase 2 projected share of ex-China global tungsten demand.
• January 1, 2027, US defence procurement ban on Chinese/Russian/Iranian/North Korean tungsten.

Why it matters

Antimony and tungsten sit at the intersection of defence manufacturing and industrial production in ways that rare earths do not: their removal from supply chains requires not just substitution of materials but requalification of products (ammunition, cutting tools) across entire industrial bases. The 2,600% antimony price spike has already repriced lead-acid batteries and fire retardants globally; the 557% tungsten move has repriced every hardmetal tool sold to manufacturing industry. Unlike gallium or germanium, where military applications are concentrated in a few chip types, antimony and tungsten are embedded in mass-volume industrial processes that cannot be renegotiated in short timeframes. The East-West price bifurcation playing out in gallium and germanium is now replicating across both metals.

What to watch

• Almonty Sangdong Phase 2 (2027) commissioning: whether it delivers 4,600 tpa and how quickly offtake contracts reach defence buyers.
• US defence procurement ban (January 2027): how US hardmetal and munitions manufacturers source tungsten in the transition period.
• Antimony supply from Southeast Asia: whether Vietnam and Laos can expand antimony trioxide capacity to materially reduce ex-China price premiums.
• China's November 2026 decision on US-specific ban suspension: whether antimony reverts to outright US ban alongside the gallium-germanium review.