DR Congo / M23 Conflict

What it is

The M23 (March 23 Movement) is an armed rebel group operating in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), primarily in North and South Kivu provinces. M23 draws its membership primarily from ethnic Tutsi former combatants of earlier eastern DRC rebel movements. The DRC government and the UN have documented Rwandan military support for M23, including direct deployment of Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops. Rwanda under President Paul Kagame has denied command-and-control over M23, citing the presence of the Hutu militia FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) in the DRC as its core security rationale. The eastern DRC has not known sustained peace since 1996, when the collapse of the Mobutu state sparked a series of overlapping wars killing an estimated 6 million people.

History

M23 was formed in April 2012 by former CNDP combatants who mutinied from the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) after accusing Kinshasa of violating a March 23, 2009 integration accord, which gave the group its name. By November 2012, M23 had briefly captured Goma, the North Kivu capital, before withdrawing under international pressure. A 2013 offensive by the FARDC, backed by MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade, dispersed the movement; its remnants regrouped in Rwanda and Uganda. M23 rearmed in late 2021 and escalated steadily through 2022 and 2023. In January 2025 it launched its largest offensive: Goma fell on January 26, with 900 to 2,000 civilian deaths by UN and DRC estimates. Bukavu, the South Kivu capital, and then Uvira fell in the weeks following. Rwanda deployed an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 troops in direct support of the offensive.

Current state

As of July 2026, M23 holds large areas of North and South Kivu under a parallel civil administration. A ceasefire nominally took effect February 18, 2026, after months of Qatar and US-brokered talks. M23 withdrew from Uvira in January 2026 under US pressure, one of the few concrete territorial concessions since the 2025 offensive. The peace process runs on two tracks: the Doha framework (Qatar-mediated DRC-M23 direct talks) and the Washington track (the DRC-Rwanda agreement signed June 27, 2025, US-guaranteed). Nine rounds of negotiations produced an updated truce-monitoring framework in April 2026, but Rwandan forces had not withdrawn and the FDLR had not been disbanded as of mid-2026. On June 26, 2026, Kinshasa filed a case at the International Court of Justice against Rwanda, its third legal attempt in 25 years, invoking the Genocide Convention and the Convention Against Torture (see DRC files ICJ case against Rwanda over three decades of atrocities in the east). Drone strikes and militia clashes near Goma continued through June 2026 (see M23 and FARDC trade drone strikes near Goma as the ceasefire frays). MONUSCO's mandate was renewed through December 20, 2026, via Resolution 2808 (December 2025).

Relationships

Rwanda's security rationale centers on the FDLR, whose leadership includes veterans of the 1994 Rwandan genocide; Kigali frames its DRC presence as defensive. Kinshasa has allied with Wazalendo (pro-DRC nationalist militias) and Burundian forces to contest M23's advance, while historically tolerating FDLR as a counterweight. The African Union mediator, Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé, co-chairs a Joint Oversight Committee alongside the US, the EU, and Qatar (see Doha-Washington peace machinery grinds on while the front rearms). Mineral wealth, particularly coltan and gold from the Kivus, flows through M23 territory toward the Rwandan border, giving both the group and Kigali an economic stake. The humanitarian toll as of late 2025 is among the world's severest: more than 7.3 million people internally displaced in the DRC, the highest figure in Africa, and 23.4 million facing acute food insecurity.

What to watch

• Whether MONUSCO's Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism can document ceasefire violations before its mandate expires in December 2026.
• ICJ proceedings in case 202 (DRC v. Rwanda): Rwanda is expected to raise preliminary objections on jurisdiction, a process that could take two to three years before any merits ruling.
• Rwandan troop withdrawal, the key material test of the Washington Agreement, with the US and EU applying aid leverage as pressure.
• M23's parallel administration in the Kivus: whether it consolidates into a lasting de facto governance structure or fractures under economic and military pressure.
• The FDLR disarmament demand, Kinshasa's core precondition, which the DRC government has historically been reluctant to enforce on a group it once used as a proxy.