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Rostec touts arms output 'the West can't dream of' as Russia scales war production

Chemezov claims artillery-shell output up 10x, MLRS rounds 12x since 2022, combat aircraft doubled

Defence·Conflicts· active The Long Game·What They're Not Saying ·8 takes · ·rbtfl upd Jun 24, 2026
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The split

The same story, as told by newsrooms in different countries. Their words, attributed and linked.

Russia

TASS

“Rostec stands ready to increase weapons production further if required, the corporation says.”

Russian state wireread the original ↗

Russia

RT

“Russia is making weapons at volumes its adversaries 'could not dream of', the Rostec chief says.”

Russian state mediaread the original ↗

Germany

European Security & Defence

“Mapping the expansion shows growth, but much rests on refurbished Soviet stockpiles.”

Western defence-analysis, skepticalread the original ↗

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Summary

Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov has pressed a campaign of output claims: shells for barrel artillery up roughly tenfold and MLRS rounds twelvefold since February 2022, combat-aircraft production doubled since the start of the Ukraine war, and a fleet of lightly-armoured vehicles and ammunition up tenfold versus 2021. Russia's state conglomerate reported 2024 revenue near $39bn and ~$8.7bn invested in plant expansion by end-2024; Chemezov says the "West is shocked by our pace." Western analysts caution the multipliers lean on refurbished Soviet stockpiles and imported components, and SIPRI records Russian exports down sharply even as domestic war output surges, see SIPRI: global arms flows up ~10% as European imports surge and Russia collapses and Rheinmetall says Germany has overtaken the US in conventional ammunition output.

By the numbers

  • ~10x, barrel-artillery shell output growth since Feb 2022 (Rostec claim).
  • ~12x, MLRS rounds growth since Feb 2022 (Rostec claim).
  • 2x, combat-aircraft production since 2022 (Rostec claim).
  • ~$39bn, Rostec 2024 revenue.
  • ~$8.7bn, plant-expansion investment by end-2024.
  • 65%, share of annual plan delivered in H1 (Chemezov).

Why it matters

Russia's ability to out-produce on shells is what sustains its attritional edge in Ukraine. The numbers are self-reported and likely flattering, but the direction, a war economy on a permanent footing, sets the bar Europe is racing to match.

What to watch

  • Independent corroboration of shell/MLRS multipliers (satellite, defector, SIPRI data).
  • Component-import substitution under sanctions pressure.
  • Whether export decline reverses as domestic demand plateaus.

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