GPS jamming becomes constant over Europe as the EU readies sanctions

Summary

GPS jamming and spoofing over Europe has gone from occasional to "basically constant," with about 40% of European air traffic now affected by GNSS interference. Lithuania says Russia expanded its spoofing antennae from 3 to 36 since early 2025; the Nordic, Baltic and Arctic regions report a five- to ten-fold rise in jamming, traced to Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula. High-profile incidents, the UK defence secretary's jet jammed flying from Estonia in May, von der Leyen's plane hit over Bulgaria, drove the EU to announce sanctions over Baltic jamming, treating it as hybrid war. Sceptics (French technical analysts) caution that some marquee "attacks" may be ambient interference, not targeting. Mitigation, hardened receivers, multi-constellation Galileo/BeiDou use, backup nav, lags the threat. Thirteen coastal states flagged growing interference in shipping lanes.

By the numbers

• ~40%, share of European air traffic affected by GNSS interference.
• 3 → 36, Russia's GPS-spoofing antennae since early 2025 (Lithuania's count).
• 5–10x, rise in jamming/spoofing in Nordic, Baltic, Arctic regions.
• 2,732, electronic-interference cases Poland logged in a single January month.

Why it matters

GPS underpins aviation, shipping, finance timing and weapons guidance; constant denial over a NATO flank is a safety and security crisis that an sanction cannot switch off. It is also the demand driver for resilient PNT and a live front of the Russia confrontation.

What to watch

• Whether EU sanctions name and deter specific operators.
• Any jamming-linked aviation incident or near-miss.
• Uptake of multi-constellation and alt-PNT receivers as the fix.