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US–EU Trade

The world's largest bilateral trade corridor linking the US and European Union, with over US$1 trillion in annual goods trade and a history of repeated tariff disputes.

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What it is

The US–EU trade relationship is the world's largest bilateral trade corridor by combined goods and services value. In 2025, two-way goods trade totalled approximately US$1.05 trillion (USTR data), with the EU running a goods surplus of roughly €199 billion (Eurostat) and the US running a services surplus of approximately US$89 billion. Together the two economies account for roughly one-third of world trade. The US Trade Representative (USTR) manages negotiations on the American side; the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade leads on behalf of EU member states, with ratification shared between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

History

The relationship is anchored in the multilateral frameworks of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), formalised under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Between 2013 and 2016, negotiators pursued the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), targeting non-tariff barriers and regulatory convergence. Talks collapsed over agriculture, investor-state arbitration, and European food-safety rules.

Trump's first administration imposed 25% steel and 10% aluminium tariffs on the EU in June 2018 under Section 232; the EU retaliated with tariffs on approximately US$3.3 billion of US goods. A July 2018 standstill brokered by Trump and Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker froze new measures but produced no deal. The Biden administration replaced the Section 232 tariffs with tariff-rate quotas in October 2021, leaving the underlying mechanisms intact.

Current state

Trump's second term resumed tariff pressure: a 10% universal baseline in February 2025, followed by country-specific rates of 20% on EU goods in April 2025. After an emergency summit in July 2025, Trump and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen issued a formal Joint Statement on 21 August 2025, establishing what is informally called the Turnberry framework. Under it, the US agreed to a 15% ceiling on most EU exports, with zero tariffs for aircraft, generic pharmaceuticals, chemical precursors, and cork. The EU in turn eliminated all duties on US industrial goods imports and improved access for selected US agricultural products. The European Parliament approved implementing legislation in June 2026; the Council of the EU gave final sign-off on 25 June 2026. The deal took effect on 1 July 2026, two days before this writing.

The EU's implementing regulations expire at end-2029. A safeguard clause allows the EU to suspend the preferential terms if US Section 232 metals tariffs remain in place past end-2026. The USTR has also opened a Section 301 forced-labor investigation covering EU supply chains, adding a separate tariff vector alongside the metals file; see USTR、中国製品に強制労働を理由とした12.5%追加関税を提案、EUとメキシコも調査対象に.

The US goods deficit with the EU stood at approximately US$219 billion in 2025, down roughly 7% year on year. A US services surplus of about US$89 billion narrows the combined trade gap considerably.

Relationships

Germany (cars and machinery), Ireland (pharmaceuticals), France (aerospace and wine) and Italy (food and fashion) carry the largest sectoral exposures on the European side. The US–EU file is the biggest of several concurrent US bilateral tariff tracks running alongside the US–China standoff and the US–India interim deal. Several Section 232 WTO panel disputes remain unresolved by the bilateral deal. The forced-labor enforcement framework echoes the mechanism behind USTR proposes forced-labor tariffs on 60 economies, Trump's post-IEEPA tariff vehicle, which targets EU supply chains among others.

What to watch

  • Whether the US suspends Section 232 metals tariffs by end-2026, or the EU invokes the safeguard clause to suspend the deal
  • The scope of the USTR's Section 301 forced-labor probe into EU industrial and agricultural supply chains
  • Progress on the non-tariff agenda, including regulatory equivalence, data flows, and public-procurement access, which the Joint Statement acknowledges but does not schedule
  • The European Commission's 2029 impact assessment and whether the implementing regulations are extended, modified, or allowed to lapse

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